Central European University Freedom and Security Discussion

Question Description

Should we, in today’s world, accept less freedom in return for more security? Please discuss with reference to the assigned text. Please Read Through the attached Document for details about the question

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Top of Form In Defense of Liberty: The Relationship Between Security and Freedom Published on July 18, 2008 by # HYPERLINK “http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/H/Victor-Hanson” \o “Victor Hanson, Ph.D.” #Victor Hanson, Ph.D.# Delivered June 3, 2008 Nile Gardiner, Ph.D.: Good morning. Welcome to the Heritage Foundation and the fifth Margaret Thatcher Freedom Lecture. The Margaret Thatcher Lecture series began in Sep#tember 2006, with a major speech by former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky on the subject, “Is Free#dom for Everyone?” It was followed by lectures on economic freedom and religious freedom by Hernan#do de Soto and Michael Novak, and by Ambassador John Bolton’s lecture “Does the United Nations Advance the Cause of Freedom?” Our distinguished speaker today is Victor Davis Han#son, who will address the theme, “In Defense of Liberty: The Relationship Between Security and Freedom.” Dr. Hanson is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Insti#tution, Stanford University; Professor Emeritus at Cal#ifornia University, Fresno; and a nationally syndicated columnist. He is also the Wayne and Marcia Buske Distinguished Fellow in History at Hillsdale College, where he teaches courses in military history and classical culture. Dr. Hanson has served as a visiting professor of classics at Stanford University and as the Visiting Shifrin Chair of Military History at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis. He received the Manhattan Institute’s Wriston Lectureship in 2004 and the 2006 Nimitz Lectureship in Military History at U.C. Berkeley. Victor Davis Hanson is the author of hundreds of articles, book reviews, scholarly papers, and newspa#per editorials on matters ranging from Greek, agrar#ian, and military history to foreign affairs, domestic politics, and contemporary culture. He is one of America’s most distinguished classi#cal scholars, and has written or edited thirteen books, including Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece; The Western Way of War;� The Wars of the Ancient Greeks; Carnage and Culture;� An Autumn of War; Ripples of Battle: How Wars of the Past Still Deter#mine How We Fight, How We Live, and How We Think, and, most recently, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War, which was named one of the New York Times Nota#ble 100 Books of 2006. Victor Davis Hanson was awarded the National Humanities Medal in 2007 and is one of the premier military historians of our time. We are honored to have him with us today to deliver the Margaret Thatcher Freedom Lecture. # HYPERLINK “http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/NileGardiner.cfm” #Nile## HYPERLINK “http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/NileGardiner.cfm” #Gardiner, Ph.D.#, is Director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Victor Davis Hanson: There cannot be freedom without security nor true security without freedom. The Greeks from the very beginning understood this symbiosis between the two, and framed the nature of the relationship-and occa#sional antithesis-between these necessary poles. The historian Thucydides, for example, makes Per#icles, in his famous funeral oration, talk in depth about the nature of democratic military service and sacrifice that are the linchpins of the freedom of Athens, and how any short-term disadvantages that may harm an open society at war are more than compensated by the creativity, exuberance, and democratic zeal that free peoples bring to war. Because, like all democratic leaders, Pericles knew the charge that liberal peoples were prone to indiscipline and incapable of collective sacrifice in times of peril, he made the argument that consensu#al societies in extremis fight as well- disciplined as closed, oligarchic communities, and yet still enjoy the advantages that accrue to liberal societies. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, al#though the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citi#zens; while in education, where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to en#counter every legitimate danger. In contrast, authors as diverse as Herodotus, Xenophon, and Aristotle remind us that the king, tyrant, and autocrat live insecure lives, since their reign is based on fear and instilled terror, and thus they dare not ever lessen their grip for an instant, lest both the people and the military turn on their despised government. The long history of Western civilization-the Persian War, the Punic Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars I and II, the Cold War-often suggests that free peoples, if slow to confront enemies on the horizon, nevertheless have been able more often than not to defeat their autocratic enemies. That is why today the West is defined by consensual gov#ernments rather than something more akin to the Napoleonic, Hitlerian, or Stalinist modes of rule. In other words, the Western tradition of civilian-controlled militaries erred on the side of openness, with the assurance that, when war came, the advan#tages of free speech, expression, and informality would more than outweigh those of discipline, rote, and authoritarianism that their dictatorial enemies embrace. The Balance of Freedom and Security The key for Western societies in times of peril has been to calibrate the proper balance between personal freedom and collective military prepared#ness and readiness. Often authoritarianism-Rome in the imperial period, Medieval monarchies, France under Napoleon, the fascism of Italy and Germany-has sacrificed personal liberties in pref#erence for security concerns and militarist cultures. Other Western societies, often in reaction to recent bloody wars, have erred in the opposite fash#ion on the side of disarmament and appeasement, and lost their liberty as a consequence of not being able to provide security for their own peoples. Here one thinks of the fate of Athens in the age of Demos#thenes or France of 1940. But more often the dilemma is not so black and white. Abraham Lincoln, and later Andrew Johnson, suspended habeas corpus in some border states to detain proConfederate sympathizers, and later Ku Klux Klan organizers. In World War II, the United States censored news from the front, hid information about military disasters, tried and executed German saboteurs in secret military tribunals, and wire#tapped the phones of suspected enemy sympathizers- and yet preserved the Constitution while fighting a global war with a military of over 12 million. Since September 11, 2001, Western societies have struggled with this age-old tension between freedom and security concerns, and a number of dilemmas have arisen. With passage of the Patriot Act, the establish#ment of the Guantanamo detention center, court-approved wiretaps, renditions of terrorist suspects abroad, and systematic surveillance, some Ameri#cans have often casually alleged that the Constitu#tion has been sacrificed to unnecessary security concerns. But it is far more difficult to calibrate this supposed loss of civil liberties than it is to appreciate the absence of a post-9/11 terrorist attack. That said, is there a danger that, in fact, we have lost much of the ability of self-expression- not through government zealousness, but a cer#tain laxity on its part to protect free speech-as a result of Western public opinion that itself is will#ing to sacrifice unfettered expression, either out of good intentions or sheer fear? The Nature of Freedom In this regard, we can ask a few rhetorical ques#tions about the nature of freedom and security in the public realm. Take a variety of contemporary genres of Western expression. Film: Is it now safer for a moviemaker to pro#duce a controversial feature-length film attacking the President of the United States (as in Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 911 or Gabriel Range’s Death of a President,which offered a dramatic version of an assassination of George Bush) or a short clip ques#tioning radical Islam, such as Gert Wilders’ Fitna or Theo Van Gogh’s Submission? Novels: Is a Western writer more in danger for writing a novel contemplating the assassination of a sitting American President (such as Nicholson Bak#er’s 2004 Alfred Knopf-published Checkpoint) or one, in allegorical fashion, caricaturing Islam (such as Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses)? Journalism: Is a Westerner more constrained from caricaturing a sitting American President in print (such as Jonathan Chait’s 2004 New Republic article, “The Case for Bush Hatred,” with its first sentence, “I hate President George W. Bush”) or drawing editorial cartoons mocking Islam (such as those initially published in 2005 in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten)? Religious Expression: Is a Western religious figure more in danger issuing a CD damning the United States (such as Rev. Jeremiah Wright call#ing the United States “The USKKK of A,” urging his congregation to “Goddamn America,” and sug#gesting that the United States deserved the 9/11 attacks) or referencing the historic relations between Islam and Christianity (such as Pope Benedict’s quotation of a 14th century Byzantine treatise about a letter from a Manuel II Paleologus to leaders of the Ottoman Empire)? Public Dissent and Expression: Would a citizen of London or Amsterdam feel more secure in violent public protest of Israeli foreign policy or in peace#fully criticizing Islamic Sharia law and its contribu#tions to terror abroad and repression at home? Government Bureaucracies: Is it more likely for an American or European government agency to prohibit the use of particular descriptive phrases, such as “Islamic terrorism” or “Jihad,” or insensitively to demonize all Muslims in its pub#lic proclamations? Each age has its demons of either laxity or authoritarianism. But our age has fostered a nov#el menace in a peculiar form of self-censorship that far exceeds anything dreamed up by the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, or the Pentagon. The only mystery about our reluc#tance to speak honestly and freely about particu#lar issues is our eagerness to give up on free expression, especially when it comes to radical Islam that fuels much of the world’s terrorism in the present post-9/11 landscape. Other than fear, one cause surely is contempo#rary postmodern ideologies, such as multicultural#ism, utopian pacifism, and moral equivalence. What these notions have in common are particular views of radical egalitarianism and Western culpa#bility for the inability to achieve it. Multiculturalism Multiculturalism-whether found in Edward Sa�d’s Orientalism or “black liberation theory” or var#ious indictments of European colonialism of Africa and the Americasgrew up in an age of postwar affluence, characterized by Western guilt over past colonialism, imperialism, and global dominance. It argues that the sins of humankind-slavery, sexism, racism, and imperialism-were uniquely Western rather than simply innate to all cultures. Therefore, we could hardly use our own arbitrary standards of “freedom” or “equality” to judge other cultures, a practice that in the past had led to the subjugation and oppression of others under dishonest banners such as “civilization.” In its most radical manifestation, multicultural#ism would argue that Westerners could not arbitrari#ly define what distinguishes the methodology of a contemporary Islamic terrorist from, say, the revolu#tionary generation of 1776 or a B-17 bombardier over Dresden or an American G.I. at Hue. Or, more broadly, the multiculturalist alleges that the West has neither the moral capital nor the intellectual deftness to condemn foreign practices such as suicide bomb#ing, religious intolerance, female circumcision, and honor killings, and so must allow that these endemic practices and customs are merely “different” rather than repugnant across time and space. The practical consequence is that millions within the West have been taught not believe in Western exceptionalism and thus insidiously convey that message to millions of immigrants who seek to enjoy the benefits of European and American life, but feel no need to assimilate into it, and, in some cases, thrive on being as antithetical to it as possible-albe#it without forfeiting the undeniable material benefits that residency within Western borders conveys. Many Westerners are now hesitant to condemn something like Sharia law in abstract terms as an enemy of freedom, or to say Islamist suicide bomb#ers kill barbarously for a uniquely evil cause. Because of multiculturalism, many in the West either don’t think jihadists pose any more threat than does their own industrial capitalist state, or, if they do, they feel that they simply lack the knowl#edge, or have previously lost the moral capital, to do anything about it. Utopian Pacifism Utopian pacifism was always innate in Western civilization, given its propensity both to wage horrific wars and, in response, to seek trans-national legisla#tive means to prevent the reoccurrence of such catas#trophes. From classical times, there has been a strain in Western letters and thought that a natural human, freed of the burdens of an oppressive civilization, might find a blissful existence without war, hunger, or the stress of the nation-state-should he be properly educated and replace emotion with reason. In revulsion to the carnage of the European 20th century, and given the respite at the end of an exis#tential threat from a nuclear Soviet Union, these old ideas about the perfectibility of human nature through education, and energized by a vast increase in national income, have again taken hold. Some#times we see these hopes manifested in world gov#ernment, such as those who advocate surrendering national sovereignty to the United Nations or the World Court at The Hague. Sometimes they are more pedagogical and more ambitious, such as establishing “Peace Studies” programs to inculcate our youth that with proper study and counsels war can be outlawed, as if the resulting carnage is a result of misunderstanding rather than evil leaders knowing exactly what they want and planning how to get it. At other moments, diplomats delude themselves into think#ing leaders of autocratic states-a Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran or Bashar Assad of Syria or North Korea’s Kim Jong-il-either have legitimate complaints against the West that explain their hos#tility or have been misrepresented in the Western press and appear bellicose largely through misun#derstanding and miscommunication. In fact, the utopian believes that such autocrats no more wish to harm us than we do them, and resort to armed threats largely as a legitimate reaction to the mili#tary preparedness of democracy. Like multiculturalism, utopian pacifism has had the effect within Western societies of defining differ#ence down, and deluding Western publics into thinking that problems with radical Islam are as much of our own making as they a result of aggres#sive jihadist doctrines. In practical terms, utopia#nism, like multiculturalism, translates into a public that does its best to convey the message that Western and radical Islamic cultures are roughly similar- and that any differences that arise can be adjudicated through greater understanding and dialogue. There#fore, novelists, filmmakers, journalists, or politicians who believe otherwise should not express their sen#timents out of concern for the greater ecumenical good-or at least exercise prudence in curtailing free expression, in recognition that their naked expres#sion may evoke a counterresponse quite injurious to the Western public in general. Moral Equivalence A third postmodern tenet that has curtailed free expression is what I would call moral equivalence, or the inability to discern Western and non-Western pathologies. As a strain of multiculturalism, moral equivalence seeks to do away with any notion of cal#ibration and magnitude and places impossible bur#dens of perfection upon Western societies. Sometimes the Western misdemeanor is defined down as equivalent to another culture’s felony. Abu Ghraib, for example, where no Iraqi detainees per#ished, is the equivalent of either a Nazi Stalag or Soviet Gulag, where millions were starved to death or executed. After all, all three were penal camps and therefore roughly equivalent in ethical terms. Context becomes irrelevant. The invasion of Iraq-approved by an elected Senate, argued over at the United Nations, intended to remove a geno#cidal dictator and leave a constitutional govern#ment in its wake-is no different from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the result of a Communist dictatorship’s desire to crush an anti-Soviet neigh#bor, waged ruthlessly against a civilian population, and resulting in the installation of an authoritarian puppet government. Standards of censure are never equally applied: We worry whether an errant bomb killed Iraqi civil#ians; silence ensues when Russians nearly obliterate Grozny and kill tens of thousands of civilians. The mishandling of the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, one of the five worst natural disasters in the nation’s history, in which 1,836 Americans were killed, is singular evidence of Amer#ican racism and incompetence; nearly 300,000 were lost in an Indonesian tsunami, a Burmese hurricane accounted for 100,000 dead, and a Chinese earth#quake took 50,000 lives-and few remarked either on the incompetence of these governments in react#ing to such a staggering loss of life or the failure of such states to provide safe and adequate housing for their populations in the first place. Despite the veneer of internationalism and car#ing, moral equivalence is predicated on the arrogant and condescending notion of low expectations- that an educated and affluent Western society must not err, while the “other” is apparently always expected to. Once the doctrine of moral equivalence is adopted, it becomes impossible to abide by any standards of censure. We circumcise infant males, so why should not the Sudanese “circumcise” female infants? We have bombed civilians, so why should not suicide bombers do the same? Timothy McVeigh was a religious, rightwing terrorist, so why are the thousands of Islamist terrorists deserv#ing of any special censure? The aggregate result of multiculturalism, utopi#an pacifism, and moral equivalence is that philo#sophically and ethically the Western� public becomes ill-equipped to condemn Islamic extrem#ism. In Western consensual societies, this so-called “political correctness” likewise permeates the legis#lative, executive, and judicial branches of govern#ment. For a variety of reasons, we voluntarily restrict free speech and expression.� But in the cases in which we otherwise would not, we do not expect our governments to have the intellectual and moral wherewithal to protect the safety of writers, film#makers, intellectuals, and journalists who chose to express themselves candidly and incur the wrath of radicals abroad. The Embarrassment of Riches One question remains. Why have these particu#lar harmful doctrines become so popular in our own era? In the general sense, the wealthier, freer, and more leisured a society becomes-and none is more so on all three counts than is 21st-century America-the more its population has the leeway, the margin of error, so to speak, both to question and feel guilty over its singular privilege. Abstract doctrines that allow one to vent remorse over our riches, without denying our enjoyment of them, sat#isfy a psychological need to reconcile what are intrinsically irreconcilable. Second, with the collapse of Communism and the rise of globalized capitalism, Marxism as a for#mal doctrine was …
Purchase answer to see full attachment

Place this order or similar order and get an amazing discount. USE Discount code “GET20” for 20% discount