BUL4310 Florida International University IRAC Summary for Case Leondard v. Pepsico

Question Description

-Must be around 2 pages

– Start with stating the FACTS of the case

-Second, write describe the PROCEDURAL HISTORY of the case (all past court and legal proceedings)

-Finally write the IRAC (Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion)

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I’ll be attaching 3 documents below:

1) The Leonard v. PepsiCo case

2) IRAC case summary sample

3) IRAC summary guide/instructions

Unformatted Attachment Preview

How to Brief a Case Using the “IRAC” Method When briefing a case, your goal is to reduce the information from the case into a format that will provide you with a helpful reference in class and for review. Most importantly, by “briefing” a case, you will grasp the problem the court faced (the issue); the relevant law the court used to solve it (the rule); how the court applied the rule to the facts (the application or “analysis”); and the outcome (the conclusion). You will then be ready to not only discuss the case, but to compare and contrast it to other cases involving a similar issue. Before attempting to “brief” a case, read the case at least once. Follow the “IRAC” method in briefing cases: Facts* Write a brief summary of the facts as the court found them to be. Eliminate facts that are not relevant to the court’s analysis. For example, a business’s street address is probably not relevant to the court’s decision of the issue of whether the business that sold a defective product is liable for the resulting injuries to the plaintiff. However, suppose a customer who was assaulted as she left its store is suing the business. The customer claims that her injuries were the reasonably foreseeable result of the business’s failure to provide security patrols. If the business is located in an upscale neighborhood, then perhaps it could argue that its failure to provide security patrols is reasonable. If the business is located in a crime-ridden area, then perhaps the customer is right. Instead of including the street address in the case brief, you may want to simply describe the type of neighborhood in which it is located. (Note: the time of day would be another relevant factor in this case, among others). Procedural History* What court authored the opinion: The United States Supreme Court? The California Court of Appeal? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals? (Hint: Check under the title of the case: The Court and year of the decision will be given). If a trial court issued the decision, is it based on a trial, or motion for summary judgment, etc.? If an appellate court issued the decision, how did the lower courts decide the case? Issue What is the question presented to the court? Usually, only one issue will be discussed, but sometimes there will be more. What are the parties fighting about, and what are they asking the court to decide? For example, in the case of the assaulted customer, the issue for a trial court to decide might be whether the business had a duty to the customer to provide security patrols. The answer to the question will help to ultimately determine * This applies to case briefs only, and not exams. Use the IRAC method in answering exams: Issue/Rule/Analysis/Conclusion. whether the business is liable for negligently failing to provide security patrols: whether the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, and what that duty of care is, are key issues in negligence claims. Rule(s): Determine what the relevant rules of law are that the court uses to make its decision. These rules will be identified and discussed by the court. For example, in the case of the assaulted customer, the relevant rule of law is that a property owner’s duty to prevent harm to invitees is determined by balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of preventive measures. There may be more than one relevant rule of law to a case: for example, in a negligence case in which the defendant argues that the plaintiff assumed the risk of harm, the relevant rules of law could be the elements of negligence, and the definition of “assumption of risk” as a defense. Don’t just simply list the cause of action, such as “negligence” as a rule of law: What rule must the court apply to the facts to determine the outcome? Application/Analysis: This may be the most important portion of the brief. The court will have examined the facts in light of the rule, and probably considered all “sides” and arguments presented to it. How courts apply the rule to the facts and analyze the case must be understood in order to properly predict outcomes in future cases involving the same issue. What does the court consider to be a relevant fact given the rule of law? How does the court interpret the rule: for example, does the court consider monetary costs of providing security patrols in weighing the burden of preventive measures? Does the court imply that if a business is in a dangerous area, then it should be willing to bear a higher cost for security? Resist the temptation to merely repeat what the court said in analyzing the facts: what does it mean to you? Summarize the court’s rationale in your own words. If you encounter a word that you do not know, use a dictionary to find its meaning. Conclusion What was the final outcome of the case? In one or two sentences, state the court’s ultimate finding. For example, the business did not owe the assaulted customer a duty to provide security patrols. Note: “Case briefing” is a skill that you will develop throughout the semester. Practice will help you develop this skill. Periodically, case briefs will be collected for purposes of feedback. At any time, you may submit your case brief(s) for feedback. BUL 4310 Assignment 1: Case Notes IRAC Analysis HABITAT II CONDOMINIUM, INC., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, Appellant, v. Derrick KERR, an individual, and Beverly J. Amie, an individual, Appellees. Facts: About May 14, 2004, defendant Beverly Amie transferred her condominium unit to defendant Derrick Kerr, without providing the Association with the proposed Contract of Sale as established in the Article 15 of the Condominium Declaration. The Association’s complaint sought an injunction requiring Kerr to transfer the property to the Association in the same terms and conditions of his purchase or, as alternative, the Association requested the court to void the transfer of the property and the require Beverly Amie to offer the property to the Association on those same terms and the complaint also sought the amount of $ 35 000. Procedural History: The Association’s complaint sought an injunction requiring Kerr to transfer the property to the Association in the same terms and conditions of his purchase or, as alternative, the Association requested the court to void the transfer of the property and the require Beverly Amie to offer the property to the Association on those same terms and the complaint also sought the amount of $ 35 000. Defendant Kerr moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the arbitration provision of section 718.1255(4), Florida Statutes (2005). The Association filed a written response claiming that this action involved an issue of “title” to the condominium unit and, hence, was not arbitrable under the arbitration statute. The granting of a motion to dismiss is reviewed do novo. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court is limited to the four corners of the complaint, the allegations of which must be taken as true, defeating defendants’ main argument that notice of the sale was given to the Association in accordance with the Declaration. The Court dismissed the action and the Association appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal Issue: The main issue in this appeal is whether this case involves a dispute subject to arbitration pursuant to Florida Statute Section 718.1255. Rule: The Association cites several arbitration decisions holding that where the Association seeks to void the transfer of a unit to a new owner, the disagreement primarily involves title to the unit, thus making the case non-arbitrable. In Florida Statute § 718.1255(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) is stated that “Dispute” does not include any disagreement that primarily involves: title to any unit or common element. Analysis: The court considered whether this case falls within the statutory exclusion that states that “Dispute” does not include any disagreement that primarily involves: title to any unit or common element… § 718.1255(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). Since the disagreement primarily involves title of the unit and this case does not involve a dispute, defendant Beverly Amie failed to comply with the requirements of the Association’s Declaration of Condominium. the matter is not subject to arbitration. Conclusion: This case does not involve a dispute, subject to arbitration. Thus the trial court improperly dismissed it and the appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. so the transfer of the unit was void due to the breach of the article 15 of the Association’s Declaration of Condominium. LEONARD v. PEPSICO United States District Court, S.D. New York 88 F.Supp.2d 116 (1999) KIMBA M. WOOD,* District Judge. Plaintiff brought this action seeking, among other things, specific performance of an alleged offer of a Harrier Jet, featured in a television advertisement for defendant’s “Pepsi Stuff” promotion. Defendant has moved for summary judgment. . . . For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion is granted. I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of a promotional campaign conducted by defendant, the producer and distributor of the soft drinks Pepsi and Diet Pepsi.1 The promotion, entitled “Pepsi Stuff,” encouraged consumers to collect “Pepsi Points” from specially marked packages of Pepsi or Diet Pepsi and redeem these points for merchandise featuring the Pepsi logo. Before introducing the promotion nationally, defendant conducted a test of the promotion in the Pacific Northwest from October 1995 to March 1996. A Pepsi Stuff catalog was distributed to consumers in the test market, including Washington State. Plaintiff is a resident of Seattle, Washington. While living in Seattle, plaintiff saw the Pepsi Stuff commercial that he contends constituted an offer of a Harrier Jet. A. The Alleged Offer Because whether the television commercial constituted an offer is the central question in this case, the Court will describe the commercial in detail. The commercial opens upon an idyllic, suburban morning, where the chirping of birds in sun-dappled trees welcomes a paperboy on his morning route. As the newspaper hits the stoop of a conventional two-story house, the tattoo of a military drum introduces the subtitle, “MONDAY 7:58 AM.” The stirring strains of a martial air mark the appearance of a well-coiffed teenager preparing to leave for school, dressed in a shirt emblazoned with the Pepsi logo, a red- white-and-blue ball. While the teenager confidently preens, the military drumroll again sounds as the subtitle “T-SHIRT 75 PEPSI POINTS” scrolls across the * Kimba M. Wood (1944 – —) attended the Sorbonne in Paris, received her B.A. from Connecticut College and her M.A. from the London School of Economics before graduating from Harvard Law School in 1969. After working in the legal services program for the poor at the federal Office of Economic Opportunity, she entered private practice where she became a litigator and antitrust expert. Since assuming the bench in 1988, her most highly publicized case was the securities fraud sentencing hearing for junk-bond king Michael Milken. In 1993, after the failed nomination of Zoe Baird to be Attorney General, President Clinton was poised to nominate Judge Wood when it was disclosed that she had employed an illegal immigrant as a nanny. Janet Reno was then nominated in her place. Judge Wood’s parents picked her name after leafing through an atlas and settling on Kimba, a small town on South Australia’s Eyre Peninsula. 1 The Court’s recitation of the facts of this case is drawn from the statements of uncontested facts submitted by the parties. . . . The majority of citations are to defendant’s statement of facts because plaintiff does not contest many of defendant’s factual assertions. . . . Plaintiff’s disagreement with certain of defendant’s statements is noted in the text. . . . [The Court’s citation to these statements and other portions of the record have been omitted.] screen. Bursting from his room, the teenager strides down the hallway wearing a leather jacket. The drumroll sounds again, as the subtitle “LEATHER JACKET 1450 PEPSI POINTS” appears. The teenager opens the door of his house and, unfazed by the glare of the early morning sunshine, puts on a pair of sunglasses. The drumroll then accompanies the subtitle “SHADES 175 PEPSI POINTS.” A voiceover then intones, “Introducing the new Pepsi Stuff catalog,” as the camera focuses on the cover of the catalog.2 The scene then shifts to three young boys sitting in front of a high school building. The boy in the middle is intent on his Pepsi Stuff Catalog, while the boys on either side are each drinking Pepsi. The three boys gaze in awe at an object rushing overhead, as the military march builds to a crescendo. The Harrier Jet is not yet visible, but the observer senses the presence of a mighty plane as the extreme winds generated by its flight create a paper maelstrom in a classroom devoted to an otherwise dull physics lesson. Finally, the Harrier Jet swings into view and lands by the side of the school building, next to a bicycle rack. Several students run for cover, and the velocity of the wind strips one hapless faculty member down to his underwear. While the faculty member is being deprived of his dignity, the voiceover announces: “Now the more Pepsi you drink, the more great stuff you’re gonna get.” The teenager opens the cockpit of the fighter and can be seen, helmetless, holding a Pepsi. “[L]ooking very pleased with himself,” the teenager exclaims, “Sure beats the bus,” and chortles. The military drumroll sounds a final time, as the following words appear: “HARRIER FIGHTER 7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS.” A few seconds later, the following appears in more stylized script: “Drink Pepsi—Get Stuff.” With that message, the music and the commercial end with a triumphant flourish. Inspired by this commercial, plaintiff set out to obtain a Harrier Jet. Plaintiff explains that he is “typical of the ‘Pepsi Generation’ . . . he is young, has an adventurous spirit, and the notion of obtaining a Harrier Jet appealed to him enormously.” Plaintiff consulted the Pepsi Stuff Catalog. The Catalog features youths dressed in Pepsi Stuff regalia or enjoying Pepsi Stuff accessories, such as “Blue Shades” (“As if you need another reason to look forward to sunny days.”), “Pepsi Tees” (“Live in ’em. Laugh in ’em. Get in ’em.”), “Bag of Balls” (“Three balls. One bag. No rules.”), and “Pepsi Phone Card” (“Call your mom!”). The Catalog specifies the number of Pepsi Points required to obtain promotional merchandise. The Catalog includes an Order Form which lists, on one side, fifty-three items of Pepsi Stuff merchandise redeemable for Pepsi Points. Conspicuously absent from the Order Form is any entry or description of a Harrier Jet. The amount of Pepsi Points required to obtain the listed merchandise ranges from 15 (for a “Jacket Tattoo” (“Sew ’em on your jacket, not your arm.”)) to 3300 (for a “Fila Mountain Bike” (“Rugged. All-terrain. Exclusively for Pepsi.”)). It should be noted that plaintiff objects to the implication that because an item was not shown in the Catalog, it was unavailable. The rear foldout pages of the Catalog contain directions for redeeming Pepsi Points for merchandise. These directions note that merchandise may be ordered “only” with the original Order Form. The Catalog notes that in the event that a consumer lacks enough Pepsi Points to obtain a desired item, additional Pepsi Points may be purchased for ten cents each; however, at least fifteen original Pepsi Points must accompany each order. Although plaintiff initially set out to collect 7,000,000 Pepsi Points by consuming Pepsi 2 At this point, the following message appears at the bottom of the screen:“Offer not available in all areas. See details on specially marked packages.” products, it soon became clear to him that he “would not be able to buy (let alone drink) enough Pepsi to collect the necessary Pepsi Points fast enough.” Reevaluating his strategy, plaintiff “focused for the first time on the packaging materials in the Pepsi Stuff promotion,” and realized that buying Pepsi Points would be a more promising option. Through acquaintances, plaintiff ultimately raised about $700,000. B. Plaintiff’s Efforts to Redeem the Alleged Offer On or about March 27, 1996, plaintiff submitted an Order Form, fifteen original Pepsi Points, and a check for $700,008.50. Plaintiff appears to have been represented by counsel at the time he mailed his check; the check is drawn on an account of plaintiff’s first set of attorneys. At the bottom of the Order Form, plaintiff wrote in “1 Harrier Jet” in the “Item” column and “7,000,000” in the “Total Points” column. In a letter accompanying his submission, plaintiff stated that the check was to purchase additional Pepsi Points “expressly for obtaining a new Harrier jet as advertised in your Pepsi Stuff commercial.” On or about May 7, 1996, defendant’s fulfillment house rejected plaintiff’s submission and returned the check, explaining that: The item that you have requested is not part of the Pepsi Stuff collection. It is not included in the catalogue or on the order form, and only catalogue merchandise can be redeemed under this program. The Harrier jet in the Pepsi commercial is fanciful and is simply included to create a humorous and entertaining ad. We apologize for any misunderstanding or confusion that you may have experienced and are enclosing some free product coupons for your use. Plaintiff’s previous counsel responded on or about May 14, 1996, as follows: Your letter of May 7, 1996 is totally unacceptable. We have reviewed the video tape of the Pepsi Stuff commercial . . . and it clearly offers the new Harrier jet for 7,000,000 Pepsi Points. Our client followed your rules explicitly. . . . This is a formal demand that you honor your commitment and make immediate arrangements to transfer the new Harrier jet to our client. If we do not receive transfer instructions within ten (10) business days of the date of this letter you will leave us no choice but to file an appropriate action against Pepsi. . . . This letter was apparently sent onward to the advertising company responsible for the actual commercial, BBDO New York. In a letter dated May 30, 1996, BBDO Vice President Raymond E. McGovern, Jr., explained to plaintiff that: I find it hard to believe that you are of the opinion that the Pepsi Stuff commercial (“Commercial”) really offers a new Harrier Jet. The use of the Jet was clearly a joke that was meant to make the Commercial more humorous and entertaining. In my opinion, no reasonable person would agree with your analysis of the Commercial. On or about June 17, 1996, plaintiff mailed a similar demand letter to defendant. . . . PepsiCo brought suit in this Court on July 18, 1996, seeking a declaratory judgment stating that it had no obligation to furnish plaintiff with a Harrier Jet. . . . II. DISCUSSION . . . As plaintiff suggests, the questions presented by this case implicate questions of contract law “deeply ingrained in the common law of England and the States of the Union.” B. Defendant’s Advertisement Was Not An Offer 1. Advertisements as Offers The general rule is that an advertisement does not constitute an offer. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains that: Advertisements of goods by display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio or television are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell. The same is true of catalogues, price lists and circulars, even though the terms of suggested bargains may be stated in some detail. It is of course p …
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